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Regional Cooperation in Employment and Training Policy: A Matter of 
Collective Action or Intergovernmental Relations?  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article provides empirical evidence that factors derived from the collective action theories 
resonated with employment and training policy implementers as the most influential for 
achieving regional cooperation for community development.  Findings indicate that having 
specific reasons and the opportunity to benefit from collaborating does more to advance 
cooperation than competing for scarce resources.  Permitting Workforce Investment Boards self-
governing authority and providing an opportunity for mutual gains are promising means for 
gaining substantive cooperation both within and across workforce investment areas in U.S. 
employment and training policy.     
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Regional Cooperation in Employment and Training Policy: A Matter of 
Collective Action or Intergovernmental Relations? 
 
Global competition is making regional economic cooperation a more meaningful policy for 
community development.  As markets integrate regionally and globalize internationally 
cooperation in economic development is becoming increasingly important.  One prominent 
feature of globalization is the value of cooperation among an increasing number of players to 
continue economic growth.  In the United States there is great potential benefit for regional 
cooperation in employment and training policy.  Employment and training policy tries to 
enhance individuals’ skills and connect people with marketable jobs in their communities.  The 
most recent employment and training policy, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, asks 
a wide variety of organizations to cooperate to meet the labor demands within economic regions.  
Additionally, WIA recommends that workforce investment board (WIB) areas that are contained 
within the same economic region cooperate across their borders.1
This study examines cooperation in U.S. regions that are integrated economically but not 
politically in both intra- and interstate metropolitan areas.  Factors that policy implementers see 
as most important to cooperation are identified.  Examining employment and training policy 
from the perspective of economic regions is salient because economic and employment problems 
typically ignore the local governments boundaries that make up intergovernmental relations in 
communities (Barnes & Ledebur,1998; Wright, 1988).  Implementing employment and training 
policy regionally may mitigate some of the competitive factors communities in metropolitan 
areas face when both business and labor are mobile.   
   
Only a few studies have made use of empirical evidence to further our understanding 
about cooperation in economic regions, especially those that are interstate.  Zimmerman 
specifically notes that interstate cooperation is an area that researchers have paid relatively little 
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attention (2002).  Those case studies that do measure or quantify their evidence for cooperation 
treat it as voluntary rather than requested by a higher authority.  Studies that do provide 
empirical evidence for voluntary cooperation include Perkmann’s work on regional cooperation 
across borders in Europe (2003), Olberding’s evidence on voluntary regional partnerships in 
economic development (2002a; 2002b) and Lackey, Freshwater and Rupasingha’s examination 
of cooperation in rural areas in Tennessee (2002).  Yet, cooperation is not always voluntary.  In 
fact, U.S. policy mandates cooperation in public policy areas such as homeland security and 
employment and training policy.  Subsequently WIA, the most recent employment and training 
policy, is a particularly good test case for understanding more about economic regional 
cooperation across communities for three reasons: 1) U.S. employment and training policies have 
historically been rife with a lack of cooperation and coordination; 2) WIA requires 17 programs 
to cooperate which is a wider variety than any previous employment and training policy; and 3) 
this federal policy encourages U.S. states to cooperate when they share a stake in the 
performance of economic regions that extend across state borders or are contained within a 
state.2
Much of our understanding of the factors that affect cooperation in the U.S. has been 
developed through case studies from intergovernmental relations (IGR)and public policy 
implementation literature (Wright, 1998; Zimmerman, 2002; Oakerson, 1987; Kenyon, 1999; 
Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; and Pressman, 1975) as well as the collective action literature on 
common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990; Singleton, 1998).
   
3  Since cooperation is not always 
voluntary, the collective action literature is particularly attractive theoretical lens to use for 
understanding regional cooperation in employment and training policy.  What is lacking is a 
clear understanding of the way the IGR and collection action theories can foster cooperation in 
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implementing public policy.  The empirical research presented here probes the answers to some 
basic questions that influence cooperation.  What factors from either literature are most 
important for gaining cooperation?  Under which circumstances are the theories important (i.e., 
interstate or intra-state cooperation)?  Is the collective action literature more relevant when the 
needed cooperation is in regions that cross multiple jurisdictions? Are there best practices or 
examples of implementation that demonstrate the empirical findings?  Drawing from these 
literatures and informed by 84 interviews with state and regional employment and training 
experts survey questions were developed. The survey questions provide an empirical assessment 
of the most important theories that can lead to cooperation by communities in intra- and 
interstate regions with an empirical assessment of the most important factors.  The interviews 
also help identify best practices or examples that illustrate the way the empirical data on the 
theories plays out in the community.  
TWO LITERATURES ON FACTORS INFLUENCING COOPERATION 
Intergovernmental Relations 
The IGR literature is a useful starting point for understanding cooperation that crosses 
jurisdictions.  It suggests several factors that are important for cooperation.  First, state and local 
jurisdictions and boundaries create complex relationships because of the overlapping political, 
fiscal, and administrative responsibilities of the governing entities (Wright, 1988, p. 333).  This 
can harm policy cooperation because each jurisdiction has the autonomy to make decisions 
within its area of authority but they may not have to take into account the effect it has on 
neighboring jurisdictions or the opportunity that working together might bring to the area. 
Political Scientist Susan E. Clarke found jurisdictions and responsibilities in workforce 
development in Denver could indeed hamper cooperation and change.  She found that:  
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"In Denver, workforce development often appeared to elicit  
conflicts between functional and territorial interests- a focus  
on workforce development processes colliding with a territorial  
focus on poor neighborhoods…To the extent that federal and  
foundation workforce development monies seemed to repeat  
funding patterns to the same territorial interests, they signaled  
a continuation of the "old ways of thinking" to some business  
interests (Clarke 2002, 14). 
Second, this literature indicates there are basic conditions for cooperation that influence 
policy outcomes.  These include the perceived sense of urgency about the problem, the 
anticipation of low financial or legal costs for the primary participants, and provision of 
information, technical and financial support (Wright, pp. 397-398).  Each of these conditions is 
relevant to both intra- and interstate cooperation in employment and training policy. The Wage 
Record Interchange System, (WRIS), is evidence that information facilitates interstate 
cooperation.  WRIS is an interstate clearinghouse for unemployment insurance wage records.  
The wage record information provided by WRIS helps workforce areas accurately calculate the 
federally mandated performance outcome that use wage data.  Specifically, WRIS provides 
workforce investment areas data on clients that use services in one state but work in another.  
The growth in the number of participating states, from seven in 2002 to 40 states in 2003, is 
undeniable evidence of the value of cooperation and sharing information under WIA (U.S. 
General Accounting Office 2002, 20; Workforce ATM 2003). 
The literature also notes the potential impact that the political image of the participants as 
well as the pursuit of different goals can have on cooperation.  Wright contends “image” refers to 
the perceptions that local officials have of other IGR participants that help them by reducing the 
uncertainty involved in interacting (Wright, p. 243) or "the subjective level of confidence with 
which each decision is made" (Downs, 1967, p. 76).4  A potential example from WIA includes 
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the willingness of organizations to share resources in a “one-stop” based on the reputation of the 
other participants even if they had not worked together previously.5
Finally, the IGR literature indicates that the pursuit of different goals impedes 
cooperation.  This occurs when two sets of actors are working on a matter but are unaware of or 
unsympathetic to the other actor's goals (Pressman; Wright).  The pursuit of different goals can 
be illustrated by the fact that some actors involved in WIA are focused on the provision of social 
services while others have a primary focus on economic development.  This results in one 
agency focusing on the provision of childcare or transportation to foster employability while 
another agency focuses on training to meet employer needs.  This results in different means, 
objectives, and goals for the actors’ work.  To this point, one state official noted that there is 
"tension between those who look at [WIA] as written for the poorer people and those who see the 
[WIA] as a broader system.”
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There are also instances of personal animosity in the intergovernmental relationship and 
this might be elicited by questioning the motives or intentions of others (Wright, 246).  An 
example from one interview that brings this theory home follows.  When asked about what 
factors keep stakeholders from cooperating to make workforce development effective the 
interviewee noted,  “We have not worked together before and in some places it is old 
relationships that go back to whether or not there should be red light or a stop sign.  I am not 
kidding.  They haven't worked together since.  It's colloquial but it matters.” 
  
 
Collective Action 
The collective action literature examines general theories and hypotheses about cooperation 
among individuals, associations, agencies, and governments and provides perhaps the best 
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opportunity to understand cooperation in employment and training policy.  It is particularly 
helpful in two ways.  First, collective action resolves problems that a single individual cannot 
solve alone.  The traditional explanation of collective action problems is that they occur when a 
lack of cooperation prevents a mutually beneficial outcome (Singleton, 1998).  Second, the 
collective action literature describes circumstances that inhibit cooperation such as free-rider 
problems and transaction costs.  This literature also suggests several mechanisms for overcoming 
collective action problems and improving cooperation such as social institutions and self 
governing authority. 
The free-rider problem occurs when people can benefit from the production of a good or 
service without contributing to the cost of its production (Sandler, 1992).  A potential example of 
the free-rider problem in employment and training policy could occur if one business provides 
job training and then another business later hires the trained employee without having 
contributed to the training.  The free-rider problem may translate to agencies or employers being 
reluctant to participate in WIA because of concerns that the benefits of their efforts are serving 
non-participating or non-paying businesses.  Agencies or institutions may also be affected by 
free-rider problems if, for the purpose of meeting performance measures, they cannot claim the 
credit for the individuals they help.   
Transaction costs are the resources devoted to measurement and enforcement of 
agreements (North, 1990) as well as the resources expended for negotiating possible solutions 
(Singleton, 1998).  Under the Manpower and Development Training Act of 1965 the Labor 
Department contracted out to at least 10,000 private businesses, non-profit and community based 
organizations, and state and local agencies to provide employment and training services.  
Ultimately, the employment training system became too complicated and fragmented for the 
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institutional arrangements to operate efficiently making the transaction costs too high.  Another 
example of the effects of transaction costs is the concern employment and training providers 
have about the cost of collecting information required under WIA.  Interviews conducted for this 
research with policy experts revealed that the burden of gathering and reporting this information 
has been a factor in training providers' reluctance to participate in the program.  
The role that social institutions play is one of the most helpful insights of the collective 
action literature for explaining cooperation in employment and training policy.   
Knight reveals that social institutions can be simple structures such as a neighborhood 
organization or more complex institutions such as economic organizations and multi-national 
corporations.  These institutions foster cooperation by providing information that resolves 
uncertainty and stabilizes expectations between participants. Additionally, institutions are helpful 
for obtaining mutually beneficial outcomes because they provide maintenance and stability in the 
distribution of outcomes so that the outcomes do not exclusively favor any one group (1992).  By 
performing this function, institutions become the arrangements that provide the opportunity to 
reduce transaction costs and help overcome collective action problems.  Social institutions 
spread the rules and uphold the values that are accepted by the participants.     
The authority for self-governing and organizing provides a necessary mechanism for 
obtaining cooperative behavior with multiple levels of government as well as promotes the 
efficient use of social institutions.  Specifically, it permits members to create their own contracts 
and thus lowering the transaction costs involved with establishing and monitoring new 
institutions, reducing free-rider problems, and fostering communication.  This leads to more 
efficient and/or stable institutions that can harness more information and resources than 
individuals or organizations could do otherwise.  The institutions themselves provide incentives 
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that foster cooperative behavior as well as a mechanism for overcoming collective action 
problems. Employment and training policy might also benefit from self-governing and self-
organizing authority that could foster local level cooperation in both the intra-state and interstate 
regions in WIA.  This authority might be guided or aided by regional and national bodies. 
In light of the discussion presented collective action theories should provide better tools 
for gaining cooperation under the circumstances as intergovernmental boundaries do not 
coincide with economic regions.  Given the increased likelihood of less voluntary and more 
mandatory cooperative endeavors do to, in part, the pressures of globalization, climate change 
and security issues the more collective action literature is likely to offer our communities.  The 
collective action literature stands to provide more in terms of tools for creating healthier and 
more secure communities both financially and physically.  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This analysis uses data compiled from a 2003 survey of all of the individual workforce 
investment board members in 46 workforce investment areas in the U.S.  The survey provides 
primary data from five interstate regions and four intra-state regions to investigate the 
aforementioned factors that affect cooperation in employment and training policy.  The five 
interstate regions are Chicago (IL-IN), Cincinnati (OH-KY-IN), Kansas City (MO-IL), 
Louisville (KY-IN), and St. Louis (MO-IL), and the four intra-state regions are Cleveland (OH), 
Indianapolis (IN), Peoria (IL), and Springfield (MO).  The interstate areas are major metropolitan 
areas with populations over one million.  The intra-state regions are chosen to control for state 
effects. 
Survey Design and Administration  
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  The survey instrument, created in 2002, uses questions derived from the IGR and 
collective action literatures as well as factors identified in interviews with policy experts.  By 
design the entire population of the local workforce investment boards was surveyed.  Using the 
entire population  reduces bias and sampling error due either investigator discretion or 
respondent characteristics. Since this study has a population that is just over 1,500 a response 
rate of 600 yields a plus or minus reliability factor just between three and four percent.    
To guard against measurement error, the survey was pre-tested for clarity of the questions 
and the reliability of responses -- measuring the concepts they were intended to measure-- with 
seventeen survey takers from the nine metropolitan regions.  Some of the changes made from the 
pre-test included adding questions that directly asked about cooperation and effectiveness.  
Finally, in March of 2003 the survey was mailed to 1,538 workforce investment board members 
in nine metropolitan areas using Dillman’s (2000) “Total Design Method”.  The final population 
of survey respondents was 1,521.7
The survey recipients were all the members of the 46 workforce boards in the nine 
metropolitan regions.  The board members are charged with oversight and guidance of the 
implementation of employment and training policy for their workforce investment areas. The 
workforce boards are comprised of members representing the many sectors that are affected by 
employment and training policy.  At the local level the chief elected official such as a mayor or 
county executive appoints the board members.  A representative from the business sector chairs 
the workforce investment board.   Additionally, business representation is required to be 51 
percent of the make-up of the board at both the state and local level.  In theory, the business 
representatives are chief executives because they have the authority to make decisions for their 
  Six hundred and ten completed surveys were returned 
providing a 40 percent response rate.   
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organization.  In practice, many times the business representative is a senior human resource 
person from the company she represents.  The other sectors represented on the boards include; 
organized labor, education (primarily but not exclusively post-secondary), economic 
development, the program agencies involved with the one-stops, community based 
organizations, government and public officials such as mayors and legislators.  Other 
representatives include constituents from sectors such as health care, child support and TANF, as 
well as farmers and other people representing community or rural interests.  The number of 
members on the workforce boards in this study ranges in size from 11 to 68. 
The diversity of the respondents approximates the membership of the board, as seen in 
Table 1.  A large majority of respondents (64%) indicate they were on the board for two years or 
more.  This fact suggests that most of the respondents have substantial experience supporting 
their comments.  The survey items (see Tables 2, 3, and 4) were drawn specifically from the two 
literatures as well as interviews with policy experts.  All questions were on a seven point scale 
with the exception of four questions that were on a five point scale.  Using the mean of the 
responses on each of the measures provides an overall sense of importance or weight of each 
factor to the responding practioners.  By examining the t-test for each and whether the outcomes 
are statistically significant provides more weight for the evidence.  The factors are also 
considered in terms of the percentage of responses as agree or strongly agree by board member 
type and type of region (i.e., intra- or interstate). Additionally, ANOVA analysis was used to 
identify differences in means by intra and interstate region type as well as differences between 
groups of board members.8  Finally a factor analysis is performed on the 10 potentially 
motivating factors to cooperation from the IGR literature and the 11 potentially motivating 
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factors derived from the Collective Action literature to further understand the theories relevance 
to cooperation with WIBs under WIA.       
[Insert Tables 1 about Here] 
FINDINGS 
 
Descriptive Data  
Findings from this survey of workforce investments board members reveal the collective action 
theory carries more explanatory weight than IGR theory in this situation.  Nonetheless a few of 
the assertions in IGR literature are important for cooperation for workforce investment board 
members and t-tests reveals that all the differences are statistically significant and did not occur 
by chance.  Table 2 reveals that the “good reputations of the board members” is the most 
important factor.  The fact that gains in cooperation would reduce financial costs of reaching 
goals is the second most important factor promoting cooperation.  The next two highest scoring 
factors are the importance of reputations for working with other boards is a sense of urgency 
about the problem.  Finally, having the roles and responsibilities of each party clearly defined 
also appears to be a factor that merits attention for obtaining cooperation by workforce board 
members.  Additionally, at the WIB level, board members personalities are not as important to 
cooperation as the literature and interviews suggest.    
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
Factors identified in the collective action literature are more relevant to regional 
cooperation than those found in the IGR literature in employment and training policy.  The 
findings in Table 3 reveal that board members are motivated to cooperate when more individuals 
and employers are being helped and once again all of the differences are statistically significant.  
The ability to provide more services was also important for gaining cooperation.  Other factors 
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that are important for obtaining cooperation are the opportunity to obtain more information, 
funds via grants, as well as the potential for mutual gains to be realized.  The ability to receive 
credit for outcomes was somewhat less important than the other criteria.  Neither the amount of 
time it takes to reach goals nor the complexity of WIA are considered particularly onerous to 
achieving cooperation from the descriptive statistics.  
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
Peoria, Illinois provides an example of the way cooperation under WIA was ultized to 
obtain resources and reduce the financial cost of increasing employment in their region for the 
benefit of both employers and employees. One interviewee from Peoria recounted that, “Without 
WIA we would not have the H-1B Grant.9
Both literatures identified that processes or the way boards organize themselves can 
foster cooperation and all but three of the noted findings were statistically significant.  Table 4 
reveals that the board members score their own boards high on several factors drawn from 
collective action theories.  These factors include boards having the ability to organize their own 
priorities and having a voice in determining the boards membership.  However, workforce 
boards often indicated that they did not have an institution that was fostering cooperation in their 
region, an important factor identified in the collective action literature.  The mean score for 
institutions was not different from the theoretical null hypothesis for this factor.  The lack of a 
universally recognized institution to facilitate cooperation may be influencing a low score on 
communicating frequently with other boards in their region which was also not different from 
null hypothesis of no effect of communication.  In general, board members are noted as bringing 
 We would have lost that opportunity.  The H-1B 
Grant put 2.5 million into training people on computers-- what we desperately needed.  Without 
WIA the money would have gone elsewhere and we would have had no way to fill our need.” 
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special interests to the table, a factor that the IGR literature indicates can hamper cooperation.  
Yet, at the same time board members are found to be sympathetic to multiple goals which the 
IGR literature suggests is important for fostering cooperation.  Combined, the responses suggest 
that board members understand the complexity of the issues they are facing when it comes to 
bringing about cooperation, but may not have all the institutional arrangements in place to 
achieve their objectives.   
An example of the complexity plays out as one interviewee noted in Indianapolis 
"Marion County is the dominant player and the other areas don’t feel they are getting enough 
attention- resources.”  He noted that “different priorities” keep stakeholders from cooperating 
“and when you are talking about different priorities you are also talking about money that people 
use for priorities and what is viewed as important for economic development and growth.”  Most 
of the regional level experts interviewed in Indianapolis saw the regional plan as merely a paper 
document.  However, one interviewee noted that, “Regional planning has helped people 
recognize the size of stakeholders out of their immediate reality” and another interviewee noted 
“It has given us a clearer understanding of the different priorities.” 
Overwhelmingly board members indicate that cooperation between workforce boards is 
important for improving the workforce development system.  Board members did not indicate 
that competition is important for improving the outcomes and the mean of  3.4 is not different 
from the null hypothesis of no effect for this factor.  Board members were slightly more likely to 
indicate a top priority of WIA is the provision of social services than they were to indicate 
economic development.  Boards members also see themselves as cooperating and effective 
within their own boards but they do not report cooperating with other boards to the same degree.  
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
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Analysis by Region Type 
There are clearly key factors that influence cooperation.  There may be differences by 
type of region that could illuminate the circumstances where collective action as opposed 
intergovernmental relations theory provided more help in achieving cooperation. The same 
measures that are in Tables 2 through 4 were aggregated to the intra and interstate level to see if 
there is a spatial difference by type of region.  As seen in Table 5 three factors differ in their 
outcomes by type of region.  Personalities are slightly more important in interstate regions than 
intra-state for gaining cooperation but in neither area are they seen as particularly important.   
Having a voice is a more important factor in both types of regions but even more so in interstate 
regions as compared to intra-state regions.  The most important factor for both regions is the 
board’s ability to organize their priorities.  Once again, this is rated higher by boards in interstate 
regions compared to boards intra-state regions.  Although the differences range only from .3 to .5 
between the regions, each factor is seen as more important to interstate regions where 
presumably there are more impediments to gaining cooperation.  Again, the collective action 
theories more frequently yield relevant information about cooperation when compared to the 
intergovernmental relations theories.    
Two examples of they way having a voice and self-organizing priorities have aided 
cooperative outcomes are the interstate cases of St. Louis and Cincinnati.  St. Louis is an 
interstate case where the governors of Illinois and Missouri mandated regional planning for 
implementing the workforce investment in the region.  In St. Louis, the East-West Gateway 
Coordinating Council (the metropolitan planning organization and council of governments) and 
the St. Louis Regional Chamber & Growth Association created the Workforce Development 
Policy Group as a governing taskforce for implementing WIA regionally in response to the 
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governors from both states declaring St. Louis a regional workforce area.  The Workforce 
Development Policy Group (WDPG) provides broad direction to the WIBs but has no legal 
authority.  The regional mandate and direction from the WDPG has resulted in the boards 
standardizing policy manuals, data sharing, and their seeking of interstate agreements, for 
example.  However, the interstate case of Cincinnati demonstrates that having an self-organizing 
board does not always ensure a high intensity of cooperation, but perhaps some cooperation. In 
Cincinnati, 13 counties, ten one-stop operators, and the business chamber put together a regional 
group called Cincinnati U.S.A. Regional One-Stop Consortium.  It is unfunded and voluntary 
and the participants take turns hosting meetings and taking minutes.  The consortium began in 
March 2001. At the local level it is well received but is primarily a vehicle for sharing basic 
information across jurisdictions rather than an organization for ensuring regional policy 
implementation.   
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
What are the most Salient Factors? 
Factor analysis is one method to test the validity of the concepts tapping into cooperation.  
Factor analysis is a purely statistical technique that indicates the degree to which factors or items 
relate to a similar concept (Kim & Mueller 1978, p. 56).  In general there are two uses of factor 
analysis: exploratory and confirmatory.  Exploratory factor analysis permits the research to 
explore if particular items are related to one another in an atheoretical fashion.  For example, if 
an investigator did not know which personality characteristics where association with a variety 
of concepts such as being introverted or extroverted, then the investigator could analyze the data 
using factor analysis and see which characteristics were more closely related to each other.  
Factor analysis is a method to test the validity of the constructs where Cronbach's Alpha helps 
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determine the reliability measures.  Typically a Cronbach’s Alpha of  .7 or higher demonstrates a 
very reliable measure of the concept.  The IGR and collective action literature provided 
substantial information about the factors that underlie the concepts of cooperation but how these 
concepts apply to cooperation under WIA is unknown.  Subsequently, exploratory factor analysis 
is useful to identify which concepts explicitly relate to cooperation with WIBs in WIA.  
 To determine which factors are most salient for fostering or hindering cooperation the 
method of factor analysis was employed.  Table 6 provides a factor analysis of 10 motivating 
concepts from the IGR literature and the Cronbach’s Alpha for the items.  Using Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) as the method of extraction it is possible to see which indicators 
have the most weight when it comes to cooperation with WIBs in WIA.10
 The items loading strongly on the first factor, were several items but in light of the 
combination and following component loadings the results suggest that “defined roles, reduced 
costs and urgency” are the most beneficial as Wright indicated these to be some of the basic 
conditions needed for cooperation in intergovernmental relations.  The nearly equal loading for 
the reputation factors in this component suggests that reputation works in concert with roles, 
urgency and ability to reduce cost.  However, the third component “Reputations” highlights the 
uniquely important role of reputations in and of itself plays for cooperation as both Wright and 
  The Cronbach’s 
Alpha at .59 is acceptable.  The eigenvalues for the first three principal components were 2.5, 1.5 
and 1.3.  Eigenvalues below one are typically discarded as minor factors (Kim and Mueller 1978, 
p. 9). The varimax rotation provided three factors supporting the cited literature.  Together the 
three factors explain 52 percent of the variance in the original items.  The loadings indicate the 
correlation with the original 10 concepts and are used to label the three salient factors for 
cooperation from the IGR literature. 
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Downs conclude the importance of image or reputation can have and reduce uncertainty which 
cannot only reduce costs but also enable intergovernmental relations by providing confidence.  
The second factor is labeled “Personalities and Interests”.  Although personalities were not 
deemed vital to cooperation from the descriptive survey data, they did appear more important in 
interstate regions than intra-state in the analysis by type of region. Findings from interviews in 
Cleveland, Ohio corroborate that personality or leadership can make a difference as interviews 
revealed no cooperation between the city of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County however the 
anticipated change of leadership with a new Mayor of Cleveland has sparked hope for 
collaboration in the future among interviewees. The factor loadings suggest that in addition to 
personalities special interests are also important.  These findings coincide with Wright, 
Pressman, Clarke’s contention that special interest or different goals are related to obtaining 
cooperation.  
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
 PCA is employed again to determine which concepts from the collective action literature 
affect cooperation with WIBs under WIA.  Table 7 provides the factor analysis of 11 concepts 
from the collective action literature and the Cronbach’s Alpha score for the items.  The 
Cronbach’s Alpha is .70 which is considered highly reliable. The eigenvalues generated from the 
varimax rotation provided four principal factors derived from the collective action literature. The 
eiginvalues for the four principal components are 3.91, 1.5, 1.12 and 1.0. Together the four 
factors account for 68 percent of the variance in the original items which is more than 16 percent 
higher than the IGR factor loadings. The loadings with the original 11 concepts are used to label 
the four salient factors for cooperation from the collective action theories. 
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 The items that loaded strongly on the first factor “More Help” all revolve around more 
people being served whether it be employers or employees.  The ability to gain more services 
and information also fosters cooperation.  This supports Singleton’s supposition that mutual 
beneficial outcomes promote cooperation. The second factor “Transaction Costs” play a clear 
role with time to reach goals and complexity of WIA being rated as high and related to 
cooperation. The third factor “Self-organizing” and allowing WIBs to have a voice in its 
membership is also an agent for cooperation as Ostrom, Singleton and other collective action 
theorist have contended.  Finally, the fourth factor “Gains and Credit” indicate mutual gains and 
the ability to receive credit are also seen as factors that contribute to cooperation under WIA.     
[Insert Table 7 about Here] 
Efforts in Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City, Missouri demonstrate they way access 
to more services, reducing transaction cost, the opportunity to self-organize and the ability to 
receive credit for outcomes can motivate cooperation. The WIBs in these two communities 
demonstrate a good working relationship and the ability to establish enabling mechanisms 
through local agreements to meet employers’ needs with the minimum hassle in terms of paper 
work for the employer.  Potential employees may be from either or both Kansas and Missouri 
training programs that are meeting employer needs because administrators work out the 
paperwork among themselves so each can obtain due credit and demonstrate accountability for 
funds.   
CONCLUSION 
The data and findings indicate the collective action literature provides more insights into ways to 
create effective cooperation across communities in employment and training policy.  This 
suggests that regional cooperation in community development is more about collective action 
 19 
than intergovernmental relations.  Perhaps this is due, in part, to the fact that there are multiple 
actors that are not directly tied to traditional government sectors. Subsequently, the problems of 
cooperation are not really confined to intergovernmental actors and actions. Cooperation is 
motivated by the way communities perceive the potential benefit or gains that will come from 
boards working together or the potential loss by not doing so. 
Information on the way boards operate in employment and training policy reveals that 
WIA provides an opportunity for boards to exercise a voice and determine their priorities for 
their communities.  Additionally, in each category where the factors are statistically significantly 
different by region type, the interstate board regions rated these factors as more important than 
did the intra-state respondents.  Board members rate institutions as low in terms of fostering 
cooperation and at the same time note less cooperation across boards than within boards in 
communities.  The data also reveal that boards clearly see cooperation as important and 
competition as less important to the success of WIA in their communities.   
Isolating specific factors that affect regional cooperation in employment and training 
policy is helpful for gaining information about cooperation in community development policy.     
Obtaining mutually beneficial outcomes motivates cooperation in employment and training 
policy.  This suggests that incentives for grants that foster collaboration among boards as well as 
access to technology or resources could be helpful in achieving cooperative outcomes across 
communities.  The findings also indicate that when cooperation is mandatory, giving boards 
reasons and rewards for cooperating is the most instructive way to create meaningful cooperation 
across communities in economic regions.  Using punitive measures or placing boards in 
competition with one another is not nearly as helpful for gaining cooperation.  The data also 
reveal that permitting self-governing authority is conducive to obtaining cooperation.  The lower 
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rating of cooperation across WIBs as compared to within WIBS is noteworthy.  It draws into 
consideration the potential value of greater institutional participation or oversight could provide 
for fostering cooperation across communities.   
Finally, the factor analysis highlights the ways both literatures can provide useful guiding 
concepts but even this statistical procedures highlights the a more significant contribution from 
the collective action literature in terms of percent of variance explained in cooperation as well as 
the greater number of components generated.  Addressing an urgent problem, reducing costs and 
clearly defined roles are some basic considerations cited in the IGR literature.  Personalities and 
special interests as well reputations of the individuals can play a role in the outcomes as 
previously noted.  The collective action literature illuminates more specifically the way the 
possibilities to serve more clients and obtain more services and information specifically can 
foster cooperation.  Transaction costs and the ability to self-organize and determine ones own 
group membership are also key factors.  Finally, mutual beneficial outcomes as well the 
opportunity to claim credit for outcomes are other specific tools that can promote cooperation 
that are drawn from the collective action literature.  
Regional cooperation across jurisdictions is anticipated to be more frequently mandated 
for the protections of communities in terms of their economic, environmental, and personal 
security.  These findings suggest future research on regional cooperation may find theories 
derived from the collective action literature to be particularly beneficial to community 
development.   Additional research on the most important factors for obtaining regional 
cooperation in policy implementation will surely help to improve our economic, environmental, 
and personal security now and into the future.  
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Table 1. Sector Representative on the Board 
 
Affiliation 
% of 
Respondents 
Business  45 
Labor Organization   7 
Education Program 13 
Economic Development Agency 5  
One-Stop Program Partner 15 
Community Based Organization 9 
Public Official1 3 
Other2 3 
         Notes: 
1. “Public Official” includes locally elected officials and  
                representatives of local government.   
 2. “Other” includes representatives from the sectors of health 
  care, public policy research, agriculture or farmer,  
  community or rural issues, youth services, child support, 
  TANF or public assistance.  
Source: Author’s calculations from Workforce Investment Board Member Survey, 2003 
 
  Table 2. t-test Results and Descriptive Statistics for Variables from the IGR Literature 
* p < .05 Notes:1. Min = minimum; Max = maximum; M= mean; SD = standard deviation; all questions on scale 
   0-7 
Source: Author’s calculations from Workforce Investment Board Member Survey, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey Question Concept Min1 Max M SD n 
1. Board members’ personalities complicate 
cooperation 
 
Personalities 
 
0 
 
7 
 
3.8* 
 
1.8 
 
605 
2. The good reputations of board members play 
a role in getting cooperation on the board. 
 
 
Reputations 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
5.5* 
 
 
1.6 
 
 
605 
3. The good reputations of board members play 
a role in getting cooperation with other 
workforce areas. 
 
 
Reputations II 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
4.8* 
 
 
2.1 
 
 
606 
4. Jurisdictional barriers such as boundaries for 
school districts, workforce investment areas 
and partner program regions are obstacles to 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
Jurisdictions  
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
3.9* 
 
 
 
2.0 
 
 
 
605 
5. There is a sense of urgency about the 
problem. 
 
Urgency 
 
0 
 
7 
 
4.8* 
 
1.7 
 
600 
6. The initial financial costs of coordinating 
activities are low. 
Low Initial 
Costs 
 
0 
 
7 
 
3.9* 
 
2.0 
 
594 
7. Coordinating will reduce financial costs. Reduce Costs 0 7 4.9* 1.9 600 
8. Roles and responsibilities of each party are 
clearly defined. 
 
Defined roles 
 
0 
 
7 
 
4.7* 
 
2.0 
 
604 
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  Table 3. t-test Results and Descriptive Statistics for Variables from the Collective Action 
  Literature 
* p < .05 Notes: 1. Min = minimum; Max = maximum; M = Mean; SD = standard deviation; all questions on scale 
   0-7  
Source: Author’s calculations from Workforce Investment Board Member Survey, 2003
Survey Question Concept Min1 Max M SD n 
9. Cooperation makes it difficult to receive 
appropriate credit for outcomes. (negatively 
worded -reversed coding) 
 
 
Credit 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
4.8* 
 
 
2.0 
 
 
607 
10. It takes too much time to reach goals 
under the WIA. 
 
Time 
 
0 
 
7 
 
4.3* 
 
1.9 
 
607 
11. The WIA is too complicated to consider 
cooperation with other workforce areas. 
 
Complexity 
 
0 
 
7 
 
3.2* 
 
1.8 
 
605 
12. More services can be provided because 
of coordination. 
 
More Services 
 
0 
 
7 
 
5.4* 
 
1.7 
 
600 
13. More employers will be served because 
of coordination. 
More 
Employers 
 
0 
 
7 
 
5.5* 
 
1.8 
 
604 
14. More individuals will be served because 
of coordination. 
More 
Individuals 
 
0 
 
7 
 
5.6* 
 
1.7 
 
603 
15. There is an opportunity to obtain more 
information. 
More 
Information 
 
0 
 
7 
 
5.4* 
 
1.7 
 
601 
16. There is an opportunity to obtain more 
grants. 
 
More Money 
 
0 
 
7 
 
4.9* 
 
2.3 
 
600 
17. The local workforce areas that work 
together are better off for having 
coordinated their activities. 
 
 
Mutual Gains 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
5.2* 
 
 
2.1 
 
 
603 
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Table 4. t-test Results and Descriptive Statistics of Measures of the way Workforce 
Investment Board Work 
* p < .05 
Notes: 1. IGR stands for intergovernmental relations and CA stands for collective action  
2. Min = minimum; Max = maximum; M = Mean; SD = standard deviation;  
3. Questions on scale 0-5 all others 0-7  
Source: Author’s calculations from Workforce Investment Board Member Survey, 2003. 
Survey Question (concept source1) Concept Min2 Max M SD n 
18. Our local board has a voice in 
determining its membership. (CA) 
 
Voice 
 
0 
 
7 
 
4.9* 
 
1.9 
 
608 
19. Our local board has the ability to 
organize its priorities as it deems 
appropriate. (CA) 
 
Organize 
Priorities 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
5.3* 
 
 
1.6 
 
 
607 
20. Board members bring special interests to 
the table. (IGR) 
 
Special Interests 
 
0 
 
7 
 
5.1* 
 
1.7 
 
608 
21. Board members are sympathetic to 
multiple goals for our workforce investment 
area. (IGR) 
 
Sympathetic to 
Multiple Goals 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
5.3* 
 
 
1.4 
 
 
604 
22. The state or other organization fosters 
cooperation among the local workforce 
areas in our metropolitan region. (CA) 
 
 
Institution 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
3.4 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
604 
23. There is frequent communication 
between our local workforce area and other 
areas in our metropolitan region. (CA) 
 
 
Communication 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
3.6 
 
 
2.4 
 
 
603 
24. How important is cooperation between 
local workforce investment areas for 
improving the workforce development 
system under WIA? (Interviews) 
 
 
 
Cooperation3  
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
4.5* 
 
 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
602 
25. How important is competition between 
local workforce investment areas for 
improving the workforce development 
system under WIA? (Interviews) 
 
 
 
Competition3 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
2.8* 
 
 
 
1.6 
 
 
 
597 
26. Economic development is a top priority 
in the workforce development system under 
WIA. (Interviews) 
Economic 
Development 
Top Priority3 
 
 
0 
 
 
5 
 
 
3.8* 
 
 
1.3 
 
 
599 
27. The provision of social services is a top 
priority in the workforce development 
system under WIA. (Interview) 
 
Social Services 
Top Priority3 
 
 
0 
 
 
5 
 
 
3.6* 
 
 
1.3 
 
 
596 
28. Competition for resources between local 
workforce areas increases the coordination 
of services. (Interviews) 
 
Competition  
Good 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
2.8* 
 
 
2.2 
 
 
598 
29. Competition between the local 
workforce areas reduces coordination of 
services. (Interviews) 
 
 
Competition Bad 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
3.4 
 
 
2.4 
 
 
603 
30. There is a high degree of cooperation in 
our workforce investment area. (Interviews) 
 
Intra-WIA  
 
0 
 
7 
 
5.1* 
 
1.6 
 
606 
31. There is a high degree of cooperation 
with our workforce investment area and 
other areas. (Interviews) 
 
 
Cross WIA  
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
4.1* 
 
 
2.0 
 
 
605 
32. Our workforce board is effective in 
achieving its goals. (Interviews) 
 
Effectiveness 
 
0 
 
7 
 
5.0* 
 
1.6 
 
606 
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Table 5. Factors that Differ by Type of Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Notes: All questions on scale 0-7 
                  1. F (1, 604) = 2.95, p < .10, Bartlett’s χ2 = .6911
                  2. F (1, 607) = 4.19, p < .05, Bartlett’s χ2 = .12 
 
                  3. F (1, 605) = 2.93, p < .10, Bartlett’s χ2 = .41 
                  4. F (1, 603) = 3.60, p < .10, Bartlett’s χ2 = .75 
Source: Author’s calculations from Workforce Investment  
Board Member Survey, 2003 
 
Table 6. Factor Analysis of 10 IGR Concepts on Cooperation   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Entries are factor coefficients from a principal component analysis with orthogonal  
rotation.  n =565 
 
 
Variable  Intra-state Interstate 
 
Personalities1 
M 
SD 
3.6 
1.8 
3.9 
1.8 
 
Voice2 
M 
SD 
4.6 
2.1 
5.0 
1.9 
Organizing 
Priorities3 
M 
SD 
5.1 
1.3 
5.4 
1.5 
Within WIA 
Cooperation4 
M 
SD 
3.8 
2.0 
4.2 
2.0 
Concept Factors 
 Financial 
Costs, Roles 
and Urgency 
Personalities 
and Interests 
Reputations 
Personalities .00 .63 -.01 
Reputations .40 -.10 .49 
Reputations II .40 .01 .42 
Jurisdictions  .15 .43 .05 
Urgency .37 -.17 -.31 
Low Initial Costs .33 .12 -.39 
Reduce Costs .38 .01 -.31 
Defined roles .39 .03 -.33 
Special Interests .13 .53 .21 
Sympathetic to 
Multiple Goals 
 
.32 
 
.28 
 
.29 
Cronbach’s α .59   
Eigenvalues 2.5 1.5 1.3 
Percent of Total 
Variance 
 
25.00 
 
14.59 
 
12.75 
Total Explained 
Variance  = 
 
52.34 
  
 27 
Table 7. Factor Analysis of 11 Collective Action Concepts on Cooperation   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Entries are factor coefficients from a principal component analysis with orthogonal rotation.   
n = 581 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concept Factors 
 More 
Helped 
Transaction 
Costs 
Self 
Organizing 
Gains and 
Credit 
Credit .15 -.29 -.22 .48 
Time -.10 .51 .39 .30 
Complexity -.17 .47 .35 .18 
More Services  .43 .13 .00 -.22 
More Employers .44 .16 .01 -.26 
More Individuals .45 .13 -.01 -.21 
More Information .40 .17 -.03 .1 
More Money .31 .19 -.01 .33 
Mutual Gains .21 -.05 -.20 .60 
Voice .15 -.38 .62 -.01 
Organize Priorities .19 -.40 .51 .12 
Cronbach’s α .77    
Eigenvalues 3.91 1.5 1.12 1.00 
Percent of Total 
Variance 
 
 
35.51 
 
 
13.60 
 
 
10.19 
 
 
9.13 
Total Explained 
Variance  = 
 
 
68.42 
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ENDNOTES 
                                               
1 Workforce Investment Board area is a designated area for implementing WIA policy. 
2 The seventeen mandated programs are: Adult Worker, Dislocated Worker, Youth, Wagner-Peyser 
Employment Service, Trade Adjustment Assistance Training, Employment and Training Services to Veterans, 
Unemployment Insurance, Job Corps, Welfare-to-Work, Senior Community Service Employment, Migrant & 
Seasonal Farmworker Employment and Training, Native American Employment and Training, Vocational 
Rehabilitation Services, Adult Education and Literacy, Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education, DHHS Community 
Services Block Grant, and HUD-administered employment and training.  Two optional programs are: Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Food Stamps Employment and Training program. 
3 Common pool resources are natural or man-made resource systems that are typically large and therefore 
costly to exclude people from using.  Typical examples of common pool resources include fishing grounds, grazing 
areas, bridges, mainframe computers, and bodies of water (Ostrom,1999, p. 30). 
4 Italics in original 
5 “One-stops” are physical locations that operate as career centers.  They provide information about and 
access to job training, education, and employment services for employers and employees alike at a single 
neighborhood office.   
6 Interviewees were assured confidentiality and therefore are not referenced individually. 
7 Board member surveys were dropped from the total population if informed they were no longer on the 
board, passed away, or changed jobs. 
8 In instances where there were unequal variances on the factors between intra- and interstate regions, t-
tests for unequal variances were conducted to determine if there is statistically significant differences between the 
means. 
9 The H-1B grant is a technical skills training grant to address domestic labor shortages in high skill and 
high technology occupations.  Its focus is on raising the technical skill levels of American workers so they can take 
advantage of the new technology-related employment opportunities.  Fees paid by employers who bring foreign 
workers into the United States to work in high skill or specialty occupations on a temporary basis under H-1B 
nonimmigrant visas finance these grants (U.S. Department of Labor, 2003).  
10 A preliminary analysis using the Keiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy indicate the 
data are suitable for PCA.  The sampling adequacy exceeds the critical value of .5 where the KMO equals .70 for the 
IGR concepts and .83 for the collective action concepts.    
11 Bartlett’s χ2 is a formal test of the equal variances assumptions.  If Bartlett’s χ2 is statistically significant 
we cannot assume equal variance and cannot trust the ANOVA results.  In instances where equal variance was 
drawn into question, two-sample t-tests for unequal variances were run. 
